How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudorandom Bits

A paper showing how to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudorandom bits. Both papers cite it for the point that a pseudorandom sequence is entirely designed, yet, if one-way functions exist, no efficient observer without the seed can tell it from chance. This is one of two limits behind teleological saturation (C2): design can hide in single events, though not effects of arbitrary size.

Cited in: both papers (Flagship: Three conjectures; Companion §10)
Used for: C2 Prediction 11C2; prediction 11
Strand: Studying up: reflexivity, observation & method · Cryptography, detection & inspection games

Cite

@article{blum1984how,
  title = {How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudorandom Bits},
  author = {Manuel Blum and Silvio Micali},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {SIAM Journal on Computing},
  doi = {10.1137/0213053},
}